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Labor Relations In The United States And
Japan: The Role Of The Enterprise In
Labor-Management Relations
DEREK

I.

H. WILSON*

INTRODUCTION

The image of Japanese labor relations is one of harmony and cooperation between management and labor. American business managers, among others, have looked enviously at the ability of their
Japanese counterparts to avoid the degree of industrial unrest so often
encountered in this country's industrial relations. Indeed, many commentators have argued that only by studying and applying Japanese
management principles may the United States maintain its dominant
position in the world economy. Uncritical endorsement of this approach, however, could prove both difficult and ultimately damaging
to American labor relations. This paper proposes to examine those
features which most distinguish Japan's system of industrial relations
and evaluate its legal and normative compatability to the United
States' labor environment. Its focus is on the attitudes and laws
which structure the employment relationship at the enterprise, or
company, level in Japan.
The three basic elements of Japanese industrial relations - lifetime (or permanent) employment, seniority-based wage and promotion, and enterprise unionism - combine to make the corporate
enterprise the organizing principle of its labor-management relations. I
Indeed, union organization, collective bargaining, and dispute settlement are all concentrated at the enterprise level in Japan. No compa* Associate, Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, San Francisco, California. B.A., 1982, University of Wisconsin at Madison; J.D., 1986, Harvard Law School. Next year, Mr. Wilson will
be on a one year leave of absence from Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro to work at the Japanese law
firm of Yanagida & Nomura in Tokyo.
1. Kazuo Koike argues that none of these features is particularly unique to Japan. For
instance, he contends that "even in the largest firms with 1,000 or more employees, where
'lifetime commitment' is said to prevail, the separation rate in a year exceeds 20 percent until
workers reach their mid-twenties." Koike, InternalLaborMarkets: Workers in Large Firms,
in CONTEMPORARY INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN JAPAN 29, 40 (T. Shirai ed. 1983). Nevertheless, whether or not each of the three "pillars" is as pure or as unique as is commonly believed,
the three together are indeed a special feature of Japanese industrial relations.
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rable pattern exists in the United States where unions are generally
organized and contracts are negotiated at the craft - or industriallevel; little authority is vested in the employees of the enterprise for
which they work.
One important consequence of Japanese enterprise unionism has
been the reduction of status differentiation within the corporate structure, particularly between blue- and white-collar workers. 2 Although
Japanese labor law excludes certain supervisory personnel from union
membership, unions do represent what would in the United States be
considered supervisors, such as foremen and lower level section
chiefs. 3 Moreover, the significant number of such supervisory ranks
included in the union membership has blurred the distinction between
supervisors and employees. 4 The relevance of this extends even to
company directors as "[o]ne out of six Japanese company directors
was once a union leader." 5 Naturally, the number of company directors who were part of the union rank and file is still higher. 6 Thus,
labor and management possess an enterprise orientation that is evident throughout their employment relationship. A leading Japanese
labor scholar has noted:
Those with higher positions continue to dress like others, often in
company uniforms, and peers retain informal terms of address and
joking relationships. Top officials reserve less salary and fewer
stock options than American top executives, and they live more
modestly. It is easier to maintain lower pay for Japanese top executives, because with loyalty so highly valued, they will not be lured
to another company. This self-denial by top executives was
designed 7to keep the devotion of the worker, and it undoubtedly
succeeds.
The contrast between this background and that existing in the
United States is striking. Under the National Labor Relations Act
2. H. Shimada, Japanese Industrial Relations: Postwar Evolution and Contemporary
Challenges 5 (Aug. 1985) (unpublished manuscript available in the Loyola of Los Angeles
International & Comparative Law Journal Office).

3. Id.
4.
5.
6.

W. GOULD, JAPAN'S RESHAPING OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 4 (1984).
Id.
Id. at 5. As Gould states, "[A]lmost anyone who has worked for a Japanese company

has been a member of a union at some point." Id.
7. Id. (quoting E. VOGEL, JAPAN AS NUMBER
(1979)).

ONE:

LESSONS FOR AMERICA
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(NLRA),8 supervisors are excluded from union membership. The operative assumption is that the supervisor-employee relationship is necessarily adversarial because supervisors represent management. 9
Moreover, American unions have had enormous difficulty organizing
nonsupervisory white-collar employees in the major industrial unions
which have an overwhelmingly blue-collar membership. 10 This paper
explores the implications of these basic differences on the relative stability of Japanese and American employment relationships.

II.

UNION ORGANIZATION IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

Enterprise unionism is one of the "three pillars" which characterizes Japanese industrial relations. It is the dominant form of union
organization, with more than ninety percent of all unions organized at
that level.I'
The special characteristics of enterprise unions shape, in many
ways, the conduct of the employment relationship in Japan. First,
membership is limited to the permanent, full-time employees of a particular enterprise. Temporary and part-time workers not regularly
12
employed in the same plant or firm are not eligible for membership.
Second, both blue- and white-collar workers are typically organized in
a single union. Union officers are elected from among the permanent
(regular) employees of the enterprise, and throughout their tenure in
office, they usually retain their employee status but are paid by the
union.1 3 Finally, although approximately seventy-two percent of the
enterprise unions are affiliated with some type of labor federation
outside the enterprise, sovereignty is retained almost exclusively at the
enterprise level.1 4 Table 1 illustrates the union forms for selected
years and the preeminence of the enterprise type of union
8. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)).
9. A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 92-93,
187 (9th ed. 1981); W. GOULD, supra note 4, at 5.
10. W. GOULD, supra note 4, at 5-6.
11. Shirai, A Theory of Enterprise Unionism, in CONTEMPORARY INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN JAPAN 117, 121 (T. Shirai ed. 1983).
12. A disproportionate number of these temporary workers are women. According to
the Japanese Ministry of Labor, in 1976 there were four times as many permanent employees
as temporary workers. Among newly hired employees the ratio was even higher. However,
among female workers there are 1.5 times as many temporary as there are permanent workers.
W. GOULD, supra note 4, at 2.
13. Id.; Shirai, supra note 11, at 119.
14. Shirai, supra note 11, at 119.
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organization. 15

TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF UNIONS AND THEIR
MEMBERSHIP AMONG DIFFERENT
FORMS OF ORGANIZATION,
1964
a
AND 1975
1964
Forms of
Organization
All Forms
Enterprise Unions
Craft Unions
Industrial Unions
Othersb

1975

No. of
Unions

No. of
Members

27,138
(100.0)
25,414
(93.6)
424
(1.6)
836
(3.1)
464

9,799,653
(100.0)
8,320,665
(84.9)
63,976
(0.7)
1,004,547
(13.1)
410,465

(1.7)

(1.7)

No. of
Unions
33,424
(100.0)
31,294
(93.6)
451
(1.6)
1,107
(3.1)
571
(1.7)

No. of
Members
12,590,400
(100.0)
10,382,225
(82.5)
140,563
(1.1)
1,663,856
(13.2)
403,756
(3.2)

Note: Percentages of unions in parentheses. Unionized workers represent
approximately 35% of total employed workers in 1964, and approximately 32% in 1975.
a This survey is conducted every year, but the distribution of unions and their
membership among different forms of organization was covered by the survey only for
selected years.
b "Others" include "general unions" which in Japan are unions of workers in small
firms or establishments organized irrespective of the trade, industry, and enterprise to
which they belong.

In operation, the enterprise union has been compared to that of a
local of an American industrial union:
In appearance, the enterprise union resembles the local of an industrial union, or an "intermediate" organization like the Ford or
General Motors departments of the United Automobile Workers. . . However, the similarity ends about there. The essential
distinction between the enterprise union and the local industrial
union is that the former is a unit in and of itself; it is not merely an

administrative component of a national union nor is it simply an
15. Id. at 122. The table was developed from information compiled by the Japan Ministry of Labor in its Basic Survey of Trade Unions (R6d6 Kumiai Kihon Ch6sa) in 1964 and
1975.
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"inside" independent company-wide union. 16

Unlike the locals of American industrial unions, the authority of the
federation to control constituent enterprise unions in Japan is limited.17 For instance, enterprise unions generally have complete autonomy to make decisions: they may change their constitution, elect
their own officers, determine the amount of union dues, and call or
terminate acts of dispute. Moreover, nationally negotiated agreements at the union federation level are the exception. A Japanese
Ministry of Labor study revealed that labor officials above the enterprise level participate in the collective bargaining of only five percent
of the 1,362 unions surveyed. The percentage declines as the size of
the enterprise union increases; the larger the union, the greater the
control it exercises in all its activities, including collective
bargaining. 18
American unions, by contrast, are organized on a craft or industrial basis, not on an enterprise basis. 19 A single union, therefore, typically represents employees of a large number of companies which
often compete in the same product market. Naturally, this has an
effect on the free exchange of ideas in the collective bargaining process
since employers do not wish to divulge proprietary information about
expansion plans and technological innovation to employees of rival
companies. More importantly, the union's appeals for solidarity are
often interpreted by employers as appeals to discourage workers from
placing their primary loyalty to the enterprise. Indeed, the union
20
seeks to instill in workers a feeling that their loyalty is to the union.
This results in a reduced sense of common interest between the union
and the employer and, similarly, leads both parties to treat the other
21
as adversaries rather than as partners.
Historically, however, craft or industrial level union organization
has been necessary in the United States in order to prevent employer
manipulation and interference in union affairs. The most effective device for discouraging unionization was the employee representation
16. Id. at 119 (quoting S. LEVINE, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN POSTWAR JAPAN 90-91
(1958)).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 120 (noting a Japan Ministry of Labor Survey in 1974, Chtid Rddd Iinkai,
Jimukyoku).
19. W. GOULD, supra note 4, at 7.
20. Id.; K. Sugeno, The Adversarial Character of American Labor Relations, Lecture
given to the Japan Institute of Labor 9 (Dec. 1984) (material was used by Professor K. Sugeno
in a Harvard Law School class, Spring 1986).
21. K. Sugeno, supra note 20, at 9.
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plan or so-called "company union" which gave workers the appearance of representation but without its substance. Typically, a union
constitution would provide that the workers would elect officers or
representatives whose function was to discuss with management any
problems of the workers. 22 On occasion, collective agreements or
plant rules were negotiated. These unions, however, lacked any genuine independence from the employer. As has been noted:
The constitution was often written by the employer; foremen and
supervisors were often members, if not officers, and represented the
interests of management rather than the interests of members; the
employer often influenced the election of officers and representatives; and any officer
who took a too aggressive position risked be23
ing discharged.
The parallel between early company unions in the United States
and enterprise unions in Japan today (in form if not in function) is
striking. In fact, related to the promotion of company unions was the
employer's insistence that it would negotiate only with representatives
drawn from its own workforce. 24 Representatives of national unions
or federations were described as "outsiders" who did not represent
the interests of workers in the plant.25 Thus the American "company
union" operated by employer manipulation in much the same way
Japanese enterprise unions operate by mutual consensus. 26 The enterprise union is inevitably dependent on the company, and the whitecollar employees, particularly the leaders, are more apt to support the
27
company than the workers in several areas of dispute.
In practice, however, enterprise unions share few of the weaknesses associated with American company unions. As Table 2 below
indicates, Japanese unions are just as effective as their Western counterparts in negotiating wages and other terms and conditions of
28
employment.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.

26.

Walter Galenson denies that enerprise unions are independent and autonomous in

representing their members. He emphasizes "their submissiveness to management or the em-

ployer, particularly because there are no professional union leaders at the local level." Shirai,
supra note 11, at 129 (discussing Galenson, The JapaneseLabor Market, in ASIA'S NEW GIANT: HOW THE JAPANESE ECONOMY WORKS (H. Patrick & H. Rosovsky eds. 1976)).
27. R. COLE, JAPANESE BLUE COLLAR: THE CHANGING TRADITION 227-28 (1971).
28. Shirai, supra note 11, at 131. The table was developed from information compiled by
the following agencies: for Japan, from the Japan Ministry of Labor's Monthly Labor Statistics
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TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF NOMINAL WAGES: BLUECOLLAR HOURLY RATE IN
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES,
1960-75
Wage Rate
Japan
U.S.
U.K.
1960
Wage rate
0.26
2.26
0.79
Differential
100
869
304
1965
Wage rate
0.45
2.61
1.01
Differential
100
580
224
1970
Wage rate
0.94
3.36
1.30
Differential
100
357
138
1975
Wage rate
2.84
4.80
2.57
Differential
100
169
90
Note: The exchange rate to the U.S. dollar is that at the end
rate in the United Kingdom is for October in 1960, 1965, and
' Rate is in U.S. dollar equivalent.

West
Germany

France

0.63
242

0.43
165

1.03
229

0.61
136

1.63
173

0.84
89

3.70
2.19
130
77
of every year. The wage
1970, but for April 1975.

Moreover, the presence of strikes, slowdowns and other forms of
work stoppages (discussed below) belie the argument that enterprise
unions are merely subservient company dominated organizations.
The reasons for the legitimacy and effectiveness of enterprise unions,
however, lies not in their structure, but in what that structure reflects
about the mutual attitudes and expectations of Japanese employees
and employers. Indeed, labor relations in Japan possess a degree of
industrial democracy which is simply foreign to the American
context.
A.

The Origin of Enterprise Unionism

The system of enterprise unionism has been traced to various historical roots. One theory argues that enterprise unions are a product
of the American Occupation which, among other things, encouraged
a free trade union movement in Japan. 29 This view suggests that the
Survey (Maigetsu Kinrd Tdkei Chdsa); for the United Kingdom, from the Department of Employment Gazette; and for the United States, West Germany and France, from the International Labor Organization (ILO) Yearbook.
29. Shirai, supra note !1, at 122.
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Japanese responded in the most expedient way possible in organizing
at the enterprise-level; the workplace is where employees can share
their interests most naturally under the Japanese employment system.
Another theory is that enterprise unionism developed because it was
the form most favored by the Communists.30 Two factors support
this contention. First, enterprise unionism conformed to the principle
of union organization advocated by the World Federation of Trade
Unions, namely, "one single union in one plant."' 31 Second, enterprise
unionism promised to counter the power of prewar right-wing union
leaders whose strength was in unions external to the enterprise. 32 The
weakness of this theory, however, is its failure to address the waning
Communist influence in the Japanese union movement beginning as
early as 1948. 33 Still another explanation is that enterprise unionism
may have evolved out of Sangyd Hdkokukai (Sampd), a wartime patriotic labor organization conceived by the Japanese government to
34
promote industrial peace and worker dedication to the war effort.
Although each of these rationales may help to explain the original impulse behind enterprise unionism, none can adequately account
for the continued strength of this form of union organization. Rather,
it is those basic conditions of Japanese employment implemented at
the company level which best explains the enduring vibrancy of enterprise unionism. Because of the enterprise orientation of employers
and employees alike, each large firm is able to create its own internal
labor market which tends to virtually all incidents of employment. It
is a relationship built of strong mutual dependence and trust.
B.

The Role of InternalLabor Markets in the Formation of
Enterprise Unions

The character of Japanese union organization is "largely a product of the structure of industry and the structure of labor markets. ' 35
In Japan's primary sector economy, consisting most prominently of
large enterprises of 500 or more employees, enterprise unionism has
30. Id. at 123. Hisashi Kawada is a prominent Japanese scholar who adheres to the belief
that enterprise unionism developed because it was favored by Communists. See Kawada,
Workers and Their Organization, in WORKERS AND EMPLOYERS IN JAPAN: THE JAPANESE

EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS SYSTEM 227-28 (K. Okochi, B. Karsh & S. Levine eds. 1973).
31. Shirai, supra note 11, at 123.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. The Development of Industrial Relations Systems, OECD Study Group Report 11-13
(1975).

1987]

Labor Relations

flourished. These companies are able to develop and support their
own internal labor market, providing such benefits as long-term employment, in-plant training, seniority-based wages, fringe benefits, and
employee welfare schemes. Only permanent employees, however, enjoy these employee entitlements, generally at the expense of employees in the secondary labor and industrial market, consisting of
multilayered subcontractors and temporary workers, who are the first
to be cut back in recessionary periods. Thus, the dual nature of the
Japanese economy is a substantial contributor to many of the labor
practices attributed to its industrial stability. 36 This might help to explain Ronald Dore's observation that it is "enterprise consciousness"
that is the cultural impetus behind Japanese workers organizing themselves into enterprise unions. He suggests that "for most Japanese
workers employed in large enterprises, the firm to which they belong
is not simply a place where they work for money, but is a community
with which they strongly identify."' 37 In this sense, the feeling of exclusivity which flows from being employed by a selective enterprise
may directly translate into a spirit of worker loyalty toward his
company.
But this explanation still fails to address the reasons that workers
in small and medium-sized enterprises also tend to organize themselves primarily into enterprise unions. One answer is that the enterprises often strive to emulate the same type of internalized labor
environment as is found in the larger enterprises. 3 8 As the economic
leaders, the large enterprises thereby set the pattern for union organization throughout Japanese industry. In addition, as is true for the
large enterprises, "the workplace is where [workers] feel the need for
solidarity to protect their common interests as employees; the enterprise union appears to them as the easiest and most workable form of
worker organization. ' 39 A final factor which perhaps best accounts
for the presence of enterprise unions in small and medium-sized firms
is the lack of an acceptable alternative form of union organization for
Japanese workers. Market oriented unions, such as craft and industrial unions, exist for only a small minority of occupations and industries. Moreover, most industrial unions, in contrast to enterprise
unions, are strongly ideological. The majority of workers "prefer not
36.
37.

W. GOULD, supra note 4, at 2.
R. DORE, BRITISH FACTORY - JAPANESE FACTORY: THE ORIGINS OF NATIONAL

DIVERSITY IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1973), noted in Shirai, supra note 11, at 127.
38. Shirai, supra note 11, at 127.
39. Id.

586
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to have their unions involved in ideological movements which may
well lead to organizational strife and divisiveness; instead, they choose
to form an enterprise union." 4
C

The Relationship of InternalLabor Markets to Employment
Adjustment in Japan and the United States

Employment adjustment has been broadly defined as the continuing process of "allocating and reallocating workers among jobs in
response to changing market conditions. ' 41 The relative flexibility
that a society in general, or a firm in particular, has in adjusting its
labor force is intimately related to the structure of its internal labor
market. A variety of background factors determine the shape and
efficiency of internal labor markets. Variables such as the historical
pattern of industrial development and union evolution, the rate of
economic growth, and the relative heterogeneity and dispersed structure of industries, population and labor markets have all influenced
the characteristics of Japanese and American employment
42
adjustment.
Because these historical patterns have developed so differently in
the two countries, little is meaningfully gained by speaking of transplanting one system of labor market instituion to the other. This does
not imply, however, that nothing is to be profited from examining
each other's experiences. Indeed, both countries share the common
goal of maximizing economic efficiency while maintaining employment stability.
Job creation and employment adjustment have proceeded relatively efficiently in both Japan and the United States. Both countries
experienced large increases in total employment between 1960 and
1980.43 Table 3 illustrates the aggregate economic and labor market
performances of the United States and Japan during those years. 44 In
the United States, fluctuations in the annual rates of economic growth
40. Id.
41. J. Orr, H. Shimada & A. Seide, United States-Japan Comparative Study of Employment Adjustment 6 (Mar. 1985) (unpublished U.S. Department of Labor study which is available in the Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Journal Office).
42. Id. at 13-16.
43. Id. at 20.
44. Id. at 21. The table was developed from information compiled by the following agencies: for U.S. economic growth rates, from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, a branch of the
U.S. Department of Commerce; for U.S. employment and unemployment statistics, from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, a branch of the U.S. Department of Labor; for Japan, all statistics
were compiled from the Japanese Statistical Yearbook.
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have affected the employment rate relatively rapidly. Additionally,
unemployment in the United States, regardless of the economic conditions, is markedly higher than in Japan. Changes in economic activity

in Japan, by comparison, have not been directly reflected in the unemployment rate. The differences in the aggregate growth in Japan and
the United States suggest variances in the process by which compa45
nies and industries adjust to changing economic conditions.
TABLE 3
COMPARISON OF AGGREGATE ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED
STATES, 1960-1980
Economic
Growth
Real

(%)
Year

U.S.

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

2.3
2.5
5.8
4.0
5.3
5.9
5.9
2.7
4.4
2.6
-.3
3.0
5.7
5.5
-1.4
-1.3
5.4
5.5
4.8
3.2
-.2

Employment

GNP

Total NonAgricultural
Total
(000,000)
Japan
U.S. Japan

Unemployment

Manufacturing

(%)

13.3
14.5
7.0
10.5
13.1
10.6
10.8
12.7
12.3
9.9
4.7
9.0
8.8
-1.2
2.4
5.3
5.1
5.6
3.7
-

54.2
53.9
55.5
56.6
58.3
60.8
63.9
65.9
67.9
70.1
70.8
71.2
73.6
76.8
78.3
80.1
79.3
82.5
86.7
89.8
90.6

30.7
31.6
32.6
33.7
34.7
35.9
37.3
39.5
40.7
41.4
42.5
43.0
44.0
45.7
46.0
46.1
46.7
47.5
48.2
49.1
50.0

Total
(000,000)
U.S.
Japan

Number
(000,000)
U.S. Japan

16.7
16.3
16.9
17.0
17.3
18.1
19.2
19.5
19.8
20.1
19.3
18.6
19.1
20.2
20.1
18.3
19.0
19.7
20.5
21.0
20.3

3.93
4.81
4.01
4.17
3.88
3.36
2.87
2.98
2.82
2.83
4.08
4.99
4.84
4.30
5.08
7.83
7.29
6.86
6.05
5.96
7.45

9.5
10.2
10.7
11.1
11.4
11.6
11.9
12.5
13.1
13.5
13.7
13.8
13.7
14.4
14.3
13.5
13.5
13.4
13.3
13.3
13.7

0.75
0.66
0.59
0.59
0.54
0.57
0.65
0.63
0.59
0.57
0.59
0.64
0.73
0.68
0.73
1.00
1.08
1.10
1.24
1.17
1.14

Rate
U.S.

Japan

5.6
6.7
5.6
5.7
5.2
4.5
3.8
3.8
3.6
3.5
4.9
5.9
5.6
4.9
5.6
8.5
7.7
7.0
6.0
5.8
7.1

1.7
1.4
1.3
1.3
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.1
1.2
1.4
4.3
1.4
1.9
2.0
2.0
2.2
2.1
2.0

In the United States, companies respond relatively quickly to
45.

Id. at 20-23.
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changes in demand with parallel changes in employment levels and
labor input. "Plant closings and mass layoffs dominate the employment adjustment processes of firms faced with major reductions in
production. '46 Moreover, management typically gives little advance
notice of plant shutdowns or restructuring which will result in serious
employment adjustments. 47 Japanese firms, on the other hand, rely
upon a greater combination of labor adjustment schemes in responding to changes in production. These include:
1. restricting overtime hours,
2. making more use of the existing workforce at the workshop,
3. reducing or stopping recruitment,
4. transferring idle labor from slack sections to busier sections of
the firm,
5. transferring idle labor from a plant with a lower level of activity to one with a higher level of activity,
6. transferring idle labor to subsidaries or other companies,
7. temporarily laying-off regular workers, usually with nearly
full-payment of regular wages,
8. dismissing temporary workers,
9. soliciting early retirement, and
48
10. conducting selected designated dismissals.
As a result of the extensive use of these various methods to reduce labor costs, Japanese firms have been able to maintain the
number of employees in the short-run, even when confronted with
steep declines in production. 49 The reasons for these distinctly different employment adjustment patterns are best explained by the attitudes and mutual expectations of employers and employees in the two
5

countries . 0
This issue is a delicate one because it has been the source of so
many distortions for both countries. The common perception is that
most blue-collar employees of large companies in Japan enter the firm
5
directly after high school and remain with that firm until they retire. 1
In fact, however, even in the largest enterprises employing 1,000 or
more workers where "lifetime commitment" is said to prevail, the
separation rate within one year exceeds twenty percent until workers
46.

Id. at 26.

47.

Id. at 103.

48.
49.
can and
50.
51.

Id. at 26.
A comparison of recent patterns of employment adjustment in several major AmeriJapanese industries is provided in the Appendix.
See W. GOULD, supra note 4, at 15.
Koike, supra note 1,at 40.
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reach their mid-twenties. 52 Moreover, employing a worker for life is
not required by law or contract. "[M]ost large Japanese companies
hire numerous classes of workers, including full-time, part-time, and
temporary workers plus sub-contractors, each expecting different de53
grees of attachment to the firm."
Similar misconceptions prevail about the United States. For instance, many foreign observers believe that in the typical American
employment relationship, an employee may be summarily dismissed
at the employer's will. In recent years, however, an increasing
number of state courts have considerably limited the scope of the atwill doctrine.5 4 One example of this is the California Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 55 where the
Court held:
In the last half century the rights of employees have not only been
proclaimed by a mass of legislation touching upon almost every
aspect of the employer-employee relationship, but the courts have
likewise evolved certain additional protections at common law.
The courts have been sensitive to the need to protect the individual
employee from discriminatory exclusion from the opportunity of
employment whether it be by the all-powerful union or employer.... This development at common law shows that the employer is not so absolute a sovereign of the job that there are not
56
limits to his prerogative.
In addition, some state courts in the United States have imposed a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing upon the employer. The rationale for this doctrine is that the employment contract does not reflect the unfettered operation of contract law, but rather is one of
adhesion between unequal parties. 57 Finally, the courts have attacked
the "terminable at will" doctrine by implying contracts between an
employer and an employee under circumstances not previously recog52. Id. The separation rate does stabilize, however, for regular employees above the age
of 25. Id. at 42.
53. J. Orr, H. Shimada & A. Seike, supra note 41, at 73. The authors' note: "The different classes of workers are trained and exposed to training ladders. The regular workers are
trained and exposed to all phases of [a] company's operations throughout their careers while
temporary workers or part-time workers receive far less intensive training programs." Id. at
74.
54.

55.
(1980).

W. GOULD, supra note 4, at 110.

Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839

56. Id. at 178, 610 P.2d at 1336, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
57. W. GOULD, supra note 4, at 110-11.
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nized. 58 Indeed, one California court pronounced the following
standard:
In determining whether there exists an implied-in-fact promise for
some form of continued employment courts have considered a variety of factors in addition to the existence of independent consideration. These have included, for example, the personnel policies
or practices of the employer, the employee's longevity of service,
actions or communications by the employer reflecting assurances
of continued employment, and the practices of the industry in
which the employee is engaged.5 9
Although both of these cases only dealt with employer-employee
relationships in nonunion settings, collective bargaining (discussed below) has also produced agreements which encourage longer-term employment. 60 This is an era of consession bargaining where a union
relinquishes its contractual right to cost-of-living increases during the
term of the collective bargaining agreement so that the employer may
become more competitive. "Part of the quid pro quo has been union
representation on committees in which future management decisions
affecting jobs are to be discussed."' 61 For instance, in six General Motors and Ford plants, the 1982 collective bargaining agreements pro62
vide for permanent employment for eighty percent of the workers.
Despite these factors augmenting the stability of employment relationships in Japan and the United States, Japanese on-the-job training and wage and compensation programs continue to demonstrate a
greater anticipation of employment longevity than the programs in
the United States. In recruiting workers, Japanese companies focus
upon the general quality and flexibility of a prospective employee
rather than that applicant's previous specialized training. 63 The initial training period for permanent, full-time employees includes an intensive introduction to the company's organization, product lines, and
production technology. 64 The rationale for this rigorous orientation is
to enable workers to fully understand the total production process
58.
59.
(1981).
60.
61.
62.
gaining
63.
64.

Id. at 111.
Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 327, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925-26

W. GOULD, supra note 4, at 103.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. Gould states that although of limited scope, this is the first major collective baragreement that appears to emulate elements of the Japanese system. Id.
J. Orr, H. Shimada & A. Seike, supra note 41, at 73.
Id.
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and the mutual responsibilities of employers and employees. 6 5 At the
shop floor level: "this emphasis is supported by the systematic rotation of workers among a wide variety of jobs within the company.
Promotions are based on improvements in skill levels and on experi'66
ence and ability in performing a variety of jobs at each level."
This approach allows for the temporary transfer of workers between related workshops in order to facilitate employment adjustment. Koike observes that "[1]arge firms are apt to have both
temporarily growing and declining workshops, between which temporary transfers are made. Thus the number of layoffs is remarkably
reduced."' 67 This pattern may also clarify the rationale for enterprise
unionism. It has been noted that Japanese workers are:
most concerned about their careers or the mobility through which
they acquire their skills ....
[T]heir careers tend to develop on the
shop floor of a firm so that some specificity is inevitable. Therefore, no workers' organization can regulate these issues more effectively than one at the enterprise level or on the shop floor. Thus, it
is reasonable that Japanese workers have chosen enterprise unions
68
to protect their interests.
In American companies, on-the-job training is also an important
part of the process of skill advancement. However, in contrast to Japanese companies, minimal efforts are made to systematically acquaint
the worker with a comprehensive knowledge of the enterprise either
during the initial training or at any subsequent point in an employee's
career. 69 Moreover, the routine rotation of workers through different
jobs for the purpose of preparing them to perform a variety of skills is
70
explicitly discouraged by the presence of rigid job classifications.
The more narrowly tailored training prgrams found in the United
States are designed to promote rapid skill acquisition and immediate
contribution to production. 71 Since the training is slight, it is economically efficient to layoff or terminate workers in a time of adjustment.
In Japanese enterprises, meanwhile, where the costs of adjustment
have been internalized, termination of regular employees is the least
economically desirable alternative. Layoffs or terminations are to be
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 76.
Id.
Koike, supra note 1, at 47.

68. Id. at 51-52.
69.
70.

J. Orr, H. Shimada & A. Seike, supra note 41, at 75.
Id.

71.

Id. at 76.
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utilized only after other adjustment possibilities have been
72
exhausted.
The structure of training programs in Japanese firms is supported
by a unique scheme of wages and compensation. "Wages are not specifically related to particular jobs. Rather, they are determined by
several factors, primarily the workers' [sic] age and tenure with the
company. '7 3 In addition, wages, which are negotiated annually, are
unusually sensitive to the current business conditions of the individual
enterprise. 74 Finally, a considerable amount of compensation in the
form of a semi-annual bonus is typically paid on the basis of the company's profitability. Japanese wage and compensation systems, therefore, give firms an additional source of flexibility in relating labor
75
costs to changing market conditions.
Wage rates in the United States, by comparison, are closely identified to specific jobs and locked into fixed promotional schemes. Employment contract provisions contain highly detailed terms to cover
such events as layoffs, recalls, transfers, and bumping rights. 76 Moreover, wages are determined by collective bargaining agreements that
are usually in force for a three year period. Wage and employment
adjustment flexibility is further limited because "workers in one company may be represented by different unions and covered under different collective bargaining agreements, often extending beyond the
domain of any one company. ' 77 In this respect, the comparatively
adversarial quality of the collective bargaining relationship in the
United States impedes the ability of management and labor to cooperatively adapt to unanticipated changing market conditions.
The discussion which follows compares the character of collective bargaining and dispute settlement practices in Japan with those in
the United States in order to evaluate the extent to which "enterprise
72. Id.
73. Id. at 76-77.
74. Id. at 77.
75. See id. at 77-78.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 80. The authors observe that
Higher initial wages reflect a higher return to the initial training and experience possessed by the worker at the time of his entry into the firm and relatively lower levels
of investment by the firm in the workers. The relatively lower rate of increases in
wages with experience indicates a relatively lower investment in training and skills by
the firm in experienced U.S. workers.
Id. at 79.
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consciousness" may have affected the bargaining attitudes and legal
environment governing labor-management relations.

III.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Three features characterize the Japanese system of collective bargaining. First, it is practiced within the boundaries of each individual
enterprise. Significantly, union officials from outside an enterprise
usually cannot participate in the bargaining at that enterprise. According to the Ministry of Labor, only ten percent of those collective
agreements surveyed in 1967 and thirteen percent surveyed in 1977
allowed outside union officials to take part in the negotiations. 7 8 Second, labor unions are concentrated in the large enterprises. 79 This is
where union membership has been the least ideological and has most
closely conformed to the traditional model of "consultation in good
faith."8 0° Third, both white- and blue-collar workers are members of,
81
and are represented by, the same union.
Article 28 of the Japanese Constitution guarantees as a fundamental human right the "eternal and inviolable" right of workers to
organize and bargain collectively.82 These guarantees have been
firmly implemented. 83 The Trade Union Law, one of Japan's major
pieces of labor legislation, provides that all bona fide unions have the
right to organize. The employer cannot refuse to bargain with a minority union simply because a majority of employees have organized
separately.84 This represents a fundamentally different philosophical
approach from that taken in American labor law where exclusive majority representation operates as a basic safeguard of union security
78. K6shiro, Development of Collective Bargainingin PostwarJapan, in CONTEMPORARY
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN JAPAN, 205, 212 (T. Shirai ed. 1983). Outside unions do, on occasion, undertake regional negotiation. For instance, "D6mei's metal workers' union in Kanagawa prefecture has a long tradition of regional negotiations in Yokohama that dates from
before the war. The union directly organizes all metal workers in the region and tries to
standardize their wages and working conditions as much as possible. The practices of S6hy6's
metal worker's union are similar." Id. at 214.
79. Id. at 205.
80. Shirai, supra note 11, at 127. Most Japanese collective bargaining contracts contain a
clause called the "consultation in good faith" clause. These provisions mandate amicable resolution of disagreements by consultation and mutual understanding. See T. HANAMI, LABOR
RELATIONS IN JAPAN 53 (1979).
81. K6shiro, supra note 78, at 205.
82. KENP6 (Constitution) art. XXVIII (Japan).
83. K6shiro, supra note 78, at 206 ("This principle has been established by court decisions and is supported as well by academic theories.").
84. T. HANAMI, supra note 80, at 108.
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and independence from management interference. In addition, the
Trade Union Law provides no method for selection of a representative. 85 Almost any two or more employees can legally require that
management recognize them as a legitimate union and engage in good
faith bargaining. 86 For instance, the Central Labor Relations Commission 87 declared that "an employer cannot refuse to bargain with a
labor union, even though the union does not prove its qualification by
88
presenting a constitution or other documents.1
Although the coexistence of rival unions is a rather exceptional
phenomenon in Japanese industrial relations, 89 it is one of the major
types of cases now being raised before the Labor Relations Commissions. 90 According to Central Labor Relations Commission statistics,
of 483 unfair labor practice cases filed with the Local Labor Relations
Commissions in 1983, 177 cases (37 percent) involved alleged discrimination between coexisting unions. 9 1 The percentage was even higher
92
among large enterprises.
Japanese case law has broadly construed the Trade Union Law
to support the workers' right to form a rival union which must be
recognized by employers. One such case was recently decided by the
Supreme Court of Japan. 93 That case involved the Japan Mail Order
Company which had two unions, one with approximately twenty employees and the other with about 120 members. In 1972, the company proposed a certain bonus on the condition that the "employees
cooperate with increasing productivity. '94 The majority union agreed
and the company paid the stated amount. However, the minority
union refused, believing that the condition was vague and would re85. W. GOULD, supra note 4, at 37.
86. K6shiro, supra note 78, at 206.
87. The Central Labor Relations Commissions were established under Chapter IV of the
Trade Union Law for the purpose of remedying unfair labor practices and adjudicating labor
disputes.
88. State Bank of Sao Paulo Tokyo Branch, 68 Meireishu 777 (1980) (a decision of the
Central Labor Relations Commission).
89. It has been estimated that "only four or five percent of all labor unions in Japan
coexist with rival unions at the same undertaking." Sugeno, The Coexistence of Rival Unions
at Undertakings and Unfair Labor Practices, 23 JAPAN LABOR BULLETIN 10 (Oct. 1984).
90. Id.

91.

Id.

92.

Id. ("For enterprises employing more than 500 employees, 66 percent of the cases

filed were rival union cases.").
93. Japan Mail Order Co. v. Tokyo Metropolitan Relations Commission, 3 R16 Keizai
Hanrei 1189 (1984) (Supreme Court Judgment).
94. Id.
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suit in mechanization with a concomitant reduction in both the labor
force and real wages, intensification of work, and subordination of the
union to the company. Since the minority union refused to accept the
condition, the company withheld the additional bonus that had been
paid to the majority union. 95 The Court analyzed the case in light of
the relative bargaining strengths of the parties involved. 96 It found
that the minority union was forced into its position as a result of the
97
employers insistence on the unreasonable (too vague) condition.
Therefore, the action of the company was deemed to be an unfair labor practice under article 7: it was done "with an intention to cause
frustration among the members of the Minority Union and thereby
weaken the organization of the Minority Union. 98 The case demonstrates the courts' fervent desire to support the right of a rival union
to organize and bargain collectively for its members.
Although the issue of minority union recognition is typically
framed in the context of the need for unfettered union ability to organize, its application may in fact reduce the overall power of unions.
The Nissan Motor Company case 99 helps to illustrate this point. Nissan acquired the Prince Automobile Company and, as a result of this
reorganization, the former Prince Company employees splintered into
two groups. The overwhelming majority supported the absorption
and changed their membership to the Nissan Labor Union. l°0 A
small minority of employees, however, chose to remain in the branch
union because they opposed Nissan's production method (a shift system requiring night work). 10 After negotiating a basic agreement
with the Nissan Union, and without seeking to negotiate with the
branch union, the company implemented a Nissan shift system accompanied by night work and planned overtime work.102 As a result,
the company gave no overtime assignments to branch union members.
The Court held that the company had first discriminated against the
branch union members concerning overtime work and then acted to
03
maintain such treatment by refraining from good faith bargaining.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

99. See Sugeno, Collective Bargainingwith Rival Unions, 24 JAPAN LABOR BULLETIN 5
(Oct. 1985) (discussing the Nissan Motor Company case of Apr. 23, 1985).

100. Id.
101.
102.

Id. (The minority numbered approximately 150 of the 7600 Prince Co. employees).
Id. at 6.

103.

Id. at 7.
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Most significantly, however, from the perspective of future union
strength, was the Court's concluding remarks. The Court stated:
[W]ith respect to the future relationship between the company and
the union, if the company exhausts its good faith efforts to explain
and persuade the branch union on the relationship of the Nissan
work system and overtime work in the manufacturing section and
the union still persists in its decision, the company can terminate
the negotiations and enter the decision to exclude the branch union
members in the section from the planned overtime work.104
The practical application of this decision would appear to benefit
the company more than the union. Indeed, it would seem possible for
a company to play each union off the other and adopt a wait-and-see
attitude as to which set of negotiations produced the most favorable
result. Or, in the event neither discussion pleased the firm, its frustration with dual track negotiations might more easily convince a fact
finder that the company had fulfilled its duty to bargain in good faith
and had simply reached impasse.105 Therefore, it is possible that
union pluralism has the potential to facilitate company manipulation
in the collective bargaining process.
This, in any case, has been a guiding premise of American labor
law as manifested by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
The NLRA imposes a threshold requirement that employers only bargain collectively with a properly elected union or union certified by
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). 106 Only unions considered to be appropriate bargaining units, meaning that there exists a
sufficient community of interests among the prospective employee
class, will be certified. Once certified, the union becomes the exclusive
bargaining representative for all the employees within the certified
class. 10 7 Thus, an employer may not bargain separately for different
terms even with willing employees. Moreover, if a properly recog104. Id.
105. From the inception of the trade union movement employers were vehemently opposed to the notion of exclusive bargaining representation, fearing that such a provision would
tip the balance too strongly in favor of labor unions. T. Hanami, Lecture at Harvard Law
School (Apr. 15, 1985). Surprisingly, unions also disfavored exclusive bargaining representa-

tion because at that time, the union movement was so factionalized that no union felt sure that
they would become the exclusive bargaining representative and hence favored plurality.
106. The NLRB was created under the NRLA to serve as the enforcement arm of the act.
National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, §§ 9-10(a), 49 Stat. 449, 451, 453 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 159-160(a) (1982)).

107.

National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935) (current verson at 29

U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982)).
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nized union negotiates a collective bargaining agreement with an employer, the NLRB will dismiss any petition for representation from a
rival union (even if it shows it has majority support) on the grounds
that the contract bars it. l08 "The contract bar has a duration of three
years or the period of the collective bargaining agreement, whichever
is shorter."' 0 9

The express purpose of the principle of exclusive representation
is to prevent the company from co-opting the union to serve its own
interests."10 This flows from the two basic goals of the NLRA which
are to institutionalize industrial conflict and encourage equality of
bargaining power between management and labor.I' Japanese labor
law pursues the similar aim (though in a different, seemingly mutually
inconsistent manner) of promoting industrial democracy by elevating
the status and power of unions in dealing with employers." I2 The
most compelling explanation reconciling these distinct approaches is
that they stem from fundamentally different assumptions about the
nature of the relationship between labor and management. This is
evident in the style and conduct of labor negotiations in both
countries.
A.

The Notion of Management Prerogative

In the United States, the NLRA imposes upon labor and management a duty to bargain in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment." 13 Though the
NLRB is strictly precluded from attempting to regulate the substantive terms of the parties agreement, refusal by either the employee or
the union to bargain collectively on these issues constitutes an unfair
labor practice.I14 As might be expected, defining the scope of
mandatory issues has been a major source of labor-management disagreement. At the root of the problem is the notion of management
prerogative, a concept deeply entrenched in American management
practices. Concerns such as long-term investment plans and the in108.

W. GOULD, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 1 (1986).

109. Id. at 92.
110. See National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, §§ 2(2), 8(l)-(2), 49 Stat. 449, 450, 452
(1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2), 158(a)(1)-(2) (1982)).
111. See id. § 1 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982)).
112. W. GOULD, supra note 4, at 34.
113. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
114. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982) (failure of an employer to bargain collectively with
the representatives of the employees is an unfair labor practice); id. § 158(b)(3) (failure of a

labor organization to bargain collectively with an employer is an unfair labor practice).
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troduction of new technology, which vitally affect future employment,
have long been considered to be outside the scope of the bargaining
process. Instead, these topics have been deemed to be within the sole
discretion of management.11 5 The need for this statutory distinction
is concededly necessary in a framework premised on hostile relationships. However, the effect is to widen the cleavage between labor and
management.
The premises of management prerogatives are perhaps even more
significant than their exercise: the enterprise is owned by the shareholders and is to be operated for the benefit of the shareholders. A
noted Japanese labor expert has indicated that
Management represents the shareholders and it is management's
responsibility to protect and promote the interests of those who
own the enterprise. Entrusted with that responsibility, management can not share decision making with the workers or the union,
for they have interests which conflict with those of the owner. This
logic on which claims of management prerogatives is based requires that collective bargaining have an adversarial character.
The more management prerogatives are emphasized, the more ad16
versarial the bargaining will be.'
Because of the nature and degree of control exercised by shareholders
over the investment decisions and management practices of American
corporations, the loyalty of most boards of directors is more closely
identified with the shareholder-owners than with the employees of the
firm. Moreover, in American companies directors are, for the most
part, named to the board from outside the company. The corporate
pattern in the United States and Europe has been described "as an
alliance of senior management and shareholders to optimize current
earnings from the company to mutual benefit."' 117 This view has far
reaching implications for the conduct of labor-management relations.
The success of the company must be assumed to depend foremost on
the particular skills of the executive-level management. The corollary
assumption is that labor is but one among many fungible units of production, important though it might be, not ultimately responsible for
a company's success or failure.
American compensation patterns reinforce this view. "In 1982
at least eighty-five American chief executives earned more than $1
115. K. Sugeno, supra note 20, at 6-7.
116. Id. at 7-8.
117. J. ABEGGLEN & G. STALK, KAISHA, THE JAPANESE

CORPORATION

184 (1985).
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million."' 18 Business Week, reporting on 1983 executive compensation levels in the United States, noted that there were twenty-five U.S.
chief executive officers with annual compensation over 2.3 million
dollars.' 1 9 Moreover, chief executive salary raises are often unrelated
to corporate profitability. Lee Iacocca, chairman and chief executive
officer of Chrysler Corporation, for instance, earned $1,617,455 in salary and bonuses - a thirty-five percent increase from 1984 - while
1 20
Chrysler's net income over the same period dropped 31.2 percent.
Meanwhile, General Motors reported paying its chairman and chief
executive officer, Roger B. Smith, $1.9 million in salary and bonuses
in 1985.121 The company's other top five executives made more than
one million dollars each. 122 Not surprisingly, the United Auto Workers union president, Owen Bieber, roundly criticized these executive
salaries, stating that they displayed "greed, self-absorbtion and poor
23
business judgment in equal and appalling measure.'
The rationale for corporate executives receiving such handsome
profit-related bonus plans and stock options is that such benefits are
incentives to help ensure that management makes decisions in the best
interests of the shareholders. 24 This is logical given that the stock
market tends to reward those companies which maintain the highest
earnings per stock share. Since declining earnings trends lowers share
price, which in turn lowers the value of earnings-pegged compensation programs, management is motivated, even on a short term quarterly basis, to maintain a steady improvement in earnings. 25 The
cumulative effect of this type of salary structure, often disproportionate to the company's economic performance, is to place the interests
of management at fundamental odds with those of labor.
Such a consequence becomes even more evident in a comparative
26
analysis. In Japan, the corporation also belongs to the shareholder. 1
118. Miller, Are You Underpaid?,FORTUNE, Mar. 19, 1984, at 21.
119. Executive Pay: The Top Earners, BUSINESS WEEK, May 7, 1984, at 88-89.
120. Wall St. J., Apr. 7, 1986, at 18, col. 1.
121. Wall St. J., Apr. 21, 1986, at 7, col. 1.
122. Id.
123. Wall St. J., Apr. 8, 1986, at 1. The UAW had earlier criticized executive pay at Ford
Motor Company. Ford executives received up to sixteen percent higher pay in bonuses in
1985, compared with 1984.
124. See J. ABEGGLEN & G. STALK, supra note 117, at 183-84.
125. Id. at 184. The authors note that in a survey regarding corporate objectives of U.S.
and Japanese management teams, U.S. executives ranked return on investment as their first
objective and share price second. Japanese executives, by comparison, rated share price as the
least important objective in managing their companies. Id. at 187.
126. Id. at 183.
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However, the role and influence of shareholders is completely different from the role and influence of shareholders in the United States.
The common stock shareholder of the Japanese corporation is similar
to a preferred shareholder in an American company. 127 Although the
shareholder anticipates dividends (not as a percent of earnings but as
a percent of the par value of the shares of the company), once this
expectation is met, the shareholder has virtually no further influence
in corporate affairs. 128 Indeed, the board of directors of Japanese
companies consists almost exclusively of senior career employees of
the company itself. Two prominent Japanese corporate scholars have
observed, "To the extent that they [board members] might be seen as
representatives of a constituency, their constituency is the career employees of the company itself." 129 Thus, the Japanese company, unlike its American counterpart, is not an organization external to its
members.
The strength of these observations is fortified by the compensation patterns of Japanese executives relative to company employees.
Fortune magazine reported that salaries of Japanese chairmen and
presidents range from $50,000 to $250,000, depending on company
0
size. 13
Rather than seeking personal income, Japanese executives focus upon enhancing the growth of the enterprise. 13 1 As a result, the
employees of the Japanese corporation share more equally in the cash
1 32
benefits from the company than is the case in the United States.
For instance, when a Japanese company is facing financial difficulties,
the general pattern is for management to announce across-the-board
cuts in executive compensation before it approaches the union to negotiate a possible wage reduction. 13 Consequently, the entire system
of compensation is premised on the assumption that the enterprise is a
134
unit in which all members share in its success or failure.
127. Id. at 184. Financial institutions are the dominant stockholders in Japanese companies, most of which are large banks and insurance companies. The funds of these financial
institutions are an accumulation of deposits and policies of the general public. Therefore,
inasmuch as the depositors are not the owners, but rather the politically and geographically
dispersed general public, there is little sense of ownership control. See generally id. at 188-90.
128. Id. at 184-85.
129. Id. at 185.
130. Miller, supra note 118, at 21.

131.

J.

132.

Id.

133.

Id. at 197.

134.

Id. at 198.

ABEGGLEN

& G.

STALK,

supra note 117, at 195.
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The Scope of Bargainingin Japan

Japanese labor law reflects a de-emphasis on the notion of managerial prerogative. Rather than concentrating on "mandatory subject[s] of bargaining" as in the United States, the Trade Union Law
states that an employer
may refuse to bargain collectively for a
"proper reason." 13 Failure to bargain without a proper reason" constitutes an unfair labor practice.1 36 The Central Labor Relations
Commission surveyed the scope of collective bargaining in 193 major
enterprise-wide agreements, defined as one thousand or more employees, and summarized the number of agreements, by type, as follows:
conclusion of the collective bargaining agreement, 7; revision and
abolition of the collective bargaining agreement, 110; new working
conditions, 53; wages and other working conditions, 61; grievances, 14; personnel affairs, 10; interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, 23; subjects for joint consultation, 50; subjects
not settled by joint consultation, 94; management, 11; subjects not
settled by other agencies, 11; any subject recognized as necessary
by the employer or the union, 61.137 [See Table

4.]138

The survey illustrates the rather vague distinction between management prerogatives and negotiable issues in the collective bargaining of large Japanese enterprises. Additionally, little distinction exists
between disputes of interest and disputes of right. 139
Typically, any conflict arising in the labor-management relationship is submitted first to joint consultation, and, if unsuccessful, then
to collective bargaining. 14 Hence, there is a procedural relationship
between joint consultation and collective bargaining. Different rules,
however, regulate the two processes. In collective bargaining, unlike
joint consultation, the union may strike to press its demands. 41
135. W. GOULD, supra note 4, at 117. The law's lack of specificity has been a source of
numerous labor disputes as to the scope of collective bargaining.

136. Id.
137. K6shiro, supra note 78, at 216 (quoting statistics compiled by the Central Labor Relations Commission, Executive Office [Chtid Rddd Iinkai, Jimukyoku] at 113 (1970)).

138. Id. at 278 (footnotes omitted). The table was developed from information compiled
by the Japan Ministry of Labor (Rdddsho) in 1976.
139. Id. at 216. Interest disputes are best characterized as arising out of the ongoing col-

lective bargaining process in which both labor and management bargain to better their position
in reaching an employment agreement. Rights disputes, on the other hand, generally involve
the interpretation and application of the substantive legal rights of the parties.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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TABLE 4

CONTENT OF LABOR DISPUTES: STRIKES AND
LOCKOUTS CLASSIFIED BY MAJOR
ISSUES, 1970, 1975
Issue
Total labor disputes
Total demands
Union security and union activities
Conclusion and overall revision of the
collective bargaining agreement
Effectiveness of the labor contracts
Wages and allowances
Wage increases
Summer and year-end bonuses
Retirement allowances
Others
Other working conditions
Hours of work
Holidays and vacations
Others
Management and personnel problems
Dismissals and reinstatement
Plant shutdowns or curtailment of
production
Others
Others

C.

1970

1975

4,446
4,533
(100%)
168

8,330
10,050
(100%)
132

37
7
3,495
(77.1%)
2,110
1,240
81
63
50
(1.1%)
14
9
27
267
(5.9%)
100

75
18
7,412
(73.7%)
5,294
1,923
40
155
375
(3.7%)
46
150
179
316
(3.1%)
120

25
142
509
(11.2%)

31
165
1,722
(17.1%)

The Spring Offensive

Unlike in American industrial relations where strikes are generally perceived as a last recourse in the collective bargaining process,
strikes in Japan are often a preliminary step to negotiation. 42 Since
142. T. HANAMI, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN JAPAN 121 (1979).
Professor Hanami has noted that:
Most of the Japanese strikes are not strikes in the Western sense. Strike is a means of
protest, or more precisely, it is the only means of showing their will. When they go
on strike, they do not mean that they will never return to their jobs until they are
satisfied or completely defeated. Rather, sometimes they first go on strike and then
start to bargain. Employers also start to bargain seriously only after the union carries
out some short-term strikes and shows how serious they are.
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the 1960's, Japanese unions have coordinated their bargaining efforts
(referred to as Shuntd, or Spring Offensive) for wages on a national
scale.1 43 In this way, the bargaining power of individual enterprise
unions is maximized by applying national pressure upon selected key
industries in the economy. This particularly benefits employees of
smaller enterprises of lesser bargaining strength. The number of
workers participating in the joint Spring Offensive has increased from
44
730,000 in 1955 to 4,390,000 in 1961, to 9,672,000 in 1979.
With the advent of the Spring Offensive, both the amount and
percentage of the wage increase have tended to become standardized.1 4 5 Simultaneously, there has been a measured decrease in wage
differentials by size of firm. It has been reported that
In 1960, high school graduates in white-collar jobs in small firms
were being paid 72 percent as much as the earnings of similar
workers employed by large firms, but by 1975 their salaries were 91
percent of those paid in the large firms. Over the same period, the
percentage figures for college and university graduates were 68 and
85.146

Thus, the use of acts of dispute occupy an important place in
Japanese labor relations. Table 5 demonstrates the increasing importance of strikes and slowdowns in forcing wage concessions from
47
management. 1
Hanami, The Characteristicsof Labor Disputes and Their Settlement in Japan, in

SOCIAL AND

209
(1971).
143. K6shiro, supra note 78, at 218-19.
144. Id. at 219.
145. Id. at 222.
146. Id. at 224 (reference to table omitted).
147. T. HANAMI, supra note 80, at 149. The table was developed from information compiled by the Japan Ministry of Labor in its Annual Report of Statistics and Survey of Labor
Disputes (Rddd Sogi Tdkei Chjsa Nen Hdkoku) in 1976.
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TABLE 5
NUMBER OF STRIKES IN JAPAN
Year
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975

Strikes longer
than half a day
1,239
1,204
1,537
1,776
2,256
2,515
2,489
3,320
5,197
3,385

Strikes shorter
than half a day
1,452
1,403
2,021
3,282
2,356
4,653
3,531
6,667
6,378
5,475

Professor Hanami perceives this as a basic dichotomy in Japanese industrial relations. On the one hand, there is a highly developed capacity for cooperation between employers and employees. However,
once disputes do arise few rules exist to regulate the conduct of the
parties by conventional means. Therefore, should tensions rise above
a certain threshold, the potential for unrestrained violence is very
real. 148 Moreover, this is due, in part, to the very legal informality
49
which many identify as responsible for Japan's industrial stability. 1
D. Joint Consultations
Although labor violence is far from unknown in Japan, the great
majority of disputes are resolved through the process of "joint consultation." 150 Joint consultation and collective bargaining are considered
the most important vehicles for labor-management communication.
Often the same union official and management representative will participate both in joint consultation meetings and collectve bargaining
sessions. As a result, the agenda for the collective bargaining session
is frequently not distinguished from that of the joint consultation
meeting. 15
There are two forms of joint consultation. One type, held three
or four times a year, is attended by top management and union lead148. T. HANAMI, supra note 80.
149. Id.
150. K6shiro, supra note 78, at 248; Inagami, Labor-Management Communication at the
Workshop Level, in
SERIES

151.

23 (1983).
Id.
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ers. Here, management representatives report on business performance and discuss future business plans and strategies. 5 2 The other
type, commonly referred to as Seisan-iinkai (production committee),
is conducted closer to the workshop level and is convened once every
month. These committees provide labor and management the opportunity to consult on monthly production and work schedules at the
factory and company level.' 53 Discussions are often informal. In
practice, joint consultation has been remarkably successful in dealing
with such diverse problems as industrial reorganization, technological
5
change, and international trade conflict.1 4
The need for joint consultation is, in part, a product of the fact
that few collective bargaining agreements in Japan set forth the working conditions of employees in any comprehensive or detailed manner.' 55 Rather than specifying each of the terms and conditions of
employment, unions look to joint consultation procedures to regulate
their employment relationship with management. 56 For instance, a
typical collective agreement will provide for "a wage increase agreement for a given year; a summer or year-end bonus agreement for a
given year; a retirement benefit agreement; an agreement implementing a reduction in working hours or a 5-day work week in a certain
manner; and so on."' 1 57 Such loosely drafted agreements allow for
enormous flexibility in responding to unanticiapted employment
problems. However, their effectiveness is wholly dependent on the
mutual trust and respect of labor and management. In this respect,
the strong enterprise identification held by both employers and employees is integral to the bargaining process.
Many enterprises, particularly the larger ones, also provide for
formal grievance procedures in collective agreements to resolve shopfloor disputes. 58 However, they play a minimal role in Japanese labor relations. One survey showed that although forty percent of enterprise unions have grievance procedures under collective
agreements or other arrangements with the employer, those procedures consist simply of a few steps of informal negotiations between
152.

Id.

153.

Id.

154. K6shiro, supra note 78, at 249.
155. K. Sugeno & K. K6shiro, Resolution of Shop Floor Disputes in Japan; Formal and
Informal Processes and the Role of Third Party Neutrals 46 (1985) (available in the Loyola of
Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal office).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 53.
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union and management representatives. They rarely provide for an
arbitration process as their final step.15 9 Moreover, such grievance
procedures are rarely utilized. 16° Table 6 shows the types of com16 1
plaints raised in the Grievance Committee at Yawhata Steel Mills.
TABLE 6
TYPES OF GRIEVANCES SET FORTH TO THE
WORKSHOP GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE
AT YAWHATA STEEL MILLS
BETWEEN APRIL 1963 AND APRIL 1984
No. of Cases
Pay problems
Periodical individual increase
Job rates
Payment by results
Bonuses
Reduced pay as a result of transfer
Hours of work
Overtime
Shift work
Transfer and assignment
Transfer
Temporary assignment to other
workshops
Assignment to other plants
Supplement to vacancy
Qualifications
Grading of qualifications
Not recommended for up-grading
examination
Up-grading
Personnel affairs
Disciplinary actions

Cases Turned Down

42
2
I
148
I
I
I
7
10
2
I
28
36
14
1

TOTAL
295
3
Between April 1963 and April 1984, a total of only 295 cases were submitted to the
Committee.
A radically different pattern is presented in the United States as to the manner in
which disputes are resolved.
As in Japan, most American collective bargaining
agreements provide for preliminary grievance procedures; however, its steps are
considerably more formal. American procedures generally involve a two- to four-step
process of relatively informal discussion with increasingly higher level union and
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 69. The table was developed from information compiled by the Department of
Labor Adminstration about the Yawhata Steel Mills of the Japan Steel Corporation.
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management officials participating at each successive stage. Furthermore, unlike in
Japan, the vast majority of those disputes arising during the life of a collective bargaining
agreement are resolved through this process. Beyond a few model programs in a select
number of companies, joint consultation is simply not an alternative available to
management and labor in resolving employment disputes. This might be expected given
that American employers and employees are much more accustomed than their Japanese
counterparts to exercising their legal rights to protect their respective positions.

III.

THIRD PARTY DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

The most important third party dispute settlement agency in Japan is the Labor Relations Commission.1 62 The Commission is
charged with two primary functions: to assure that union and management conduct their relations fairly, and to prevent the escalation of
labor disputes which would be detrimental to society. 63 The Commission's major duties "are to adjudicate unfair labor practice cases
and to adjust labor disputes." 164 Procedures for regulating both responsibilities are designed to assist the parties to develop their own
rules for the resolution of individual and collective disputes by mutual
agreement. 165
The Commission's adjudicatory machinery is invoked upon receipt of a complaint filed either by a union or individual that an employer has committed some form of unfair labor practice. The
Commission will then investigate the complaint and if necessary, hold
a hearing to examine witnesses and evidence. 166 This is a formal adversary proceeding open to the public in which both parties are usu167
ally represented by lawyers, most of whom specialize in labor cases.
Although procedurally, the Commission is expected to issue a
formal written decision concluding whether or not an unfair labor
practice has been committed, in practice, the Commission's most important function is mediative.1 68 The petitioning party normally seeks
the assistance of the Commission panel to resolve the dispute volunta162. The Labor Relations Commission consists of a Central Labor Relations Commission
in Tokyo and forty-seven Local Labor Relations Commissions, one in each prefecture. Id. at
61. See generally W. GOULD, supra note 4, at 27, 40-41.
163. Matsuda, Conflict Resolution in Japanese Industrial Relations, in CONTEMPORARY
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN JAPAN 179, 179-80 (T. Shirai ed. 1983).

164.
165.

K. Sugeno & K. K6shiro, supra note 155, at 62.
Matsuda, supra note 163, at 179.

166.

T. HANAMI, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN JAPAN 142 (1979).

167. K. Sugeno & K. K6shiro, supra note 155, at 62.
168. Id. at 63.
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rily because this represents the more expedient remedy. 69 The respondent, meanwhile, is also inclined to favor a voluntary settlement
70
in the interests of promoting smoother relations at the workplace.1
Moreover, the institutional orientation of the Commission is that voluntary settlements produce more stable long-term labor relations than
compulsory orders. Accordingly, in the great majority of cases, the
panel pursues voluntary settlements and will only issue a formal decision only as a last resort.1 7 ' Indeed, if at any time the panel perceives
a possibility for a negotiated settlement, it will suspend the proceedings and hold intensive "meetings for settlement."'' 7 2 At this time, the
panel interviews both parties individually in order to evaluate the possibilities for achieving a settlement.1 73 As a consequence of these efforts, seventy percent of unfair labor practice cases are resolved by
agreements negotiated by the parties themselves, either outside the
174
proceeding or in the presence of the panel.
The other important Labor Relations Commission function, administering the procedures for adjusting labor disputes, is performed
in accordance with the Labor Relations Adjustment Act.17 5 The Act
provides for three methods of adjusting labor disputes: conciliation,
mediation, and arbitration. In conciliation, the least formal of the
three procedures, the Commission chairman appoints a conciliator
upon the request of either party to the dispute or upon the chairman's
own initiative.1 76 Mediation is a more formal adjustment procedure
than conciliation. 77 Unlike conciliation, mediation cannot be invoked by a mere request of one party or on the chairman's own initiative. "The mediation committee interviews both parties to ascertain
their cases and then makes a formal mediation proposal to settle the
case, which is not binding on the parties.1' ' 78 Arbitration, finally, is
the most formal adjustment method in which a committee award has
179
the same binding legal effect as a collective agreement.
The methods of adjustment most often chosen by the disputing
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 63-64.
Id. at 64.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 65.
Id.
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parties tells something about the nature of their relationship. "In
1983, 1,113 labor disputes were adjusted by the Labor Relations Commissions: 95.4 percent of them were handled by conciliation, 3.9 percent by mediation, and 0.7 percent by arbitration."' 8 0° Moreover, the
wide range of subjects of dispute reveals that little differentiation is
made in Japan between interest disputes and rights disputes. Sugeno
and Koshiro have observed that
Looking at the subjects dealt with in those adjustment procedures,
62.4 percent involved economic matters such as wage increases
(17.4 percent), bonuses (17.0 percent), working hours and holidays
(7.7 percent) and retirement benefits (6.3 percent), while 36.8 percent concerned non-economic matters such as methods and conditions of negotiations (17.2 percent), managerial and personnel
affairs (dismissals, disciplinary measures, transfers, employment
adjustment, moving of plant, etc., 10.4 percent), recognition of labor unions and rules of union activities (2.7 percent) ....Thus, we
can roughly speculate that a substantial percentage (15-20 percent)
of disputes adjusted every year through conciliation procedures...
involve individual employees' rights, and more than half of them
are resolved by attaining agreement between the parties.' 8 '
The labor dispute adjustment process thus reveals a system of industrial relations premised on the need for continuous informal negotiation and information sharing.
Even the courts, to which a party to a dispute may appeal a Labor Relations Commission order, consistently encourage voluntary
1 2
settlements rather than pronounce a legally principled decision.
The court may suspend a proceeding at any stage and assist the parties in reaching an agreement. In fact, approximately sixty percent of
the labor cases filed in courts by workers complaining of an unfair
labor practice are resolved through voluntary settlement. 8 3 The
forces responsible for reaching compromise appear to be similar,
whether the forum is the court or the Labor Relations Commission.
These include institutional pressures to make concessions in order for
the relationship to prosper, a belief by either party that the benefit
achieved through legal recourse is not worth the attendant costs, and
84
the parties' desire to improve the union-management relationship.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id. at 61.
Id.

184.

See generally id. at 58-66.
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By comparison, the pattern of dispute settlement in the United
States reveals considerably more antagonism in union-management
relations. On average, there have been thirty times more unfair labor
practice complaints filed in the United States than in Japan (see Table
7). 185 The agency responsible for adjudicating these complaints is the
National Labor Relations Board. Once a complaint is filed before the
NLRB, the agency engages in a rigorous investigation which is characterized by an appreciably greater willingness than their administrative counterparts in Japan to intervene in the conduct of the
employer-employee relationship.18 6 Like the Labor Relations Commission, however, the NLRB urges the parties to either compromise
or withdraw their complaint. In fact, most settlements have taken
place at this early stage of the proceeding. (See Table 8).187
TABLE 7
NUMBER OF UNFAIR-LABOR-PRACTICE
CASES FILED
Japan

U.S.

Year

Local
Commission

Central
Commission

(NLRB)

1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

929
730
729
685
563
778

93
98
95
64
83
84

31,253
34,509
37,828
39,652
41,259
44,063

What occurs subsequently in the proceeding, however, offers the
most telling comparison. Unlike the Labor Relations Commission,
the NLRB procedures provide little basis to facilitate a settlement.
Once a complaint is issued, a highly formal judicial process is engaged
which significantly diminishes the likelihood of voluntary settlement.18 8 Gould comments that:
185. W. GOULD, supra note 4, at 45. The table was developed from information compiled
by the following agencies: for Japan, from the Annual Report of the Central Labor Relations
Commission; for the United States, from the National Labor Relations Board Annual Reports.
Id. at 48.
186. Id. at 49-50.
187. Id. at 49-51. The table was reprinted from page 256 of the 1980 National Labor
Relations Board Annual Report. Id. at 50.
188. Id. at 51.
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A majority of the small number of formal agreements are entered
into either after a complaint has issued or after a hearing has commenced. However, the same is true of only about one-third of the
informal settlements. This seems to indicate that the complaint
and the hearing produce a considerably more adversarial and confrontational atmosphere.... [T]he more formal procedure reduces
189
the prospect for settlement.

TABLE 8
NLRB SETTLEMENTS OF UNFAIR-LABORPRACTICE CASES, FISCAL YEAR 1980
Percentage
of total

Method and stage
of disposition

Number

cases closed

Percentage
of total
method

Agreement of parties

11,531

27.5

100.0

Informal settlement
Before issuance of

11,357

27.0

98.5

7,424

17.7

64.4

3,848

9.2

33.4

85
174

0.2
0.5

0.7
1.5

0.3
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.1
100.0

1.0
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.2
0.3
0.0

complaint

After issuance of
complaint, before opening of hearing
After opening of hearing,

before issuance of
administrative law judge's

decision
Formal settlement
After issuance of complaint,
before opening of hearing
Stipulated decision
Consent decree
After opening of hearing
Stipulated decision
Consent decree
Total number of cases closed

118
60
58
56
17
39
42,047

However, the tremendous number of unfair labor disputes filed in
the United States relative to Japan is not remarkable in light of the
absence of informal procedures to resolve labor-management differences short of legal action. This is a natural consequence of a relationship premised on discordant motives and purposes. Given this
background, legal rules must (and should) be utilized both to institutionalize conflict and to protect the due process rights of the concerned parties. Unlike in Japan, there exists in the United States no
189. Id. (footnote omitted).
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underlying assumption of group harmony that threatens to be eroded
by seeking third-party assistance in resolving a labor dispute.
V.

CONCLUSION

In identifying the major differences in Japanese and American
labor relations, many of the subtleties which might otherwise soften
the distinctions are sometimes lost. Cooperation is not unknown in
American labor-management relations. In fact, in this era of concession bargaining, employees are becoming increasingly aware that their
economic future is directly related to the ability of their company to
remain competitive in the market place. Moreover, American managers obviously appreciate the need to generate employee loyalty to their
enterprise. Compensation schemes such as employee stock option
plans, designed to motivate employees in much the same way that
bonus plans motivate management, represent a step in this direction.
Similarly, labor-management consensus is not necessarily the
rule in Japanese industrial relations. As has been shown, conflict, and
even violence, has frequently occurred in labor-management dealings,
particularly in the smaller enterprises.1 90 Moreover, as Japan shifts
its focus from that of an export oriented economy to more of an import and domestic economy, significant changes may result in the relative allegiance that employees bring to the enterprises in which they
work.
Nevertheless, the general tone of labor-management relations in
Japan and the United States is most distinct. Japanese managers and
employees demonstrate a sense of enterprise identity and consciousness that simply has no corollary in American industrial relations.
The corporate enterprise, as the organizing principle of Japan's system of labor relations, shapes and defines all incidents of the employment relationship. As a result, the labor-management relationship in
founded upon a common purpose which is fundamentally foreign to
American experience.
190. Labor relations are most antagonistic in Japan's public sector (beyond the scope of
this paper), which accounts for forty percent of all strikes in Japan with four times the employee participation rate than that found in the private sector. For a discussion of the growth
of public-employee unionism in Japan, see generally W. GOULD, supra note 4, at 152-61.
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APPENDIX

The following is a profile of employment adjustment patterns in
selected American and Japanese industries which is the product of a
recent (1985) joint United States-Japan Comparative Study of Employment Adjustment.191
The US. Automobile Industry
Production and employment in the U.S. automobile industry
fluctuated dramatically over the 1970's. Short-term declines in employment in the 1970 and 1973-75 recessions, for example, affected
over 100,000 and 150,000 workers, respectively. Following these recessions, employment levels increased to their pre-recessionary peaks,
with the employment rate growing almost as rapidly as the rate of
decline. Employment in the automobile industry declined again between 1979 and 1980 by over 200,000. By the end of 1980, monthly
layoff rates averaged 4.4 percent, up from 1.0 percent in 1978, and
unemployment in the industry reached a historic high of 20.3 percent
with over 150,000 workers on indefinite layoff.
The declines in employment caused by the recession were superimposed on several longer-term problems the industry was experiencing. The increase in the price of gasoline and the periodic
uncertainties in obtaining adequate supplies began with the oil-crisis
in 1973 and continued through the decade. U.S. consumer purchase
preferences shifted from larger-size, high-profit automobile models
traditionally produced by American car manufacturers to smaller,
more fuel-efficient cars. At the same time, and partly as a result of
these trends, U.S. producers began to lose their share of the domestic
automobile market. In 1975, imports of passenger automobiles were
slightly over two million units. By 1979, imports had increased to 2.8
million units, or over thirty-two percent of the domestic market, with
imports from Japan accounting for over fifty percent of all imports.
The trends in the automobile market have resulted in large-scale
permanent job losses and plant closings by each of the three major
U.S. auto producers - Chrysler, General Motors, and Ford. Recent
Chrysler Corporation plant closings have affected over 20,000 workers in ten plants including over 4,000 workers each in the Hamtramk
assembly plant and the Mack Avenue stamping plant in Michigan.
Over forty percent of Chrysler's hourly work force was on indefinite
191.

J. Orr, H. Shimada & A. Seike, supra note 41.
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layoff by mid-1980. Ford closed six plants in 1980 affecting almost
10,000 workers, including 4,800 workers in its Mahwah assembly
plant in New Jersey. Over thirty-five percent of Ford's hourly work
force was on indefinite layoff in mid-1980. General Motors has also
shut down operations in six plants, although these facilities are scheduled to be replaced by newer plants.
The adjustment problems in the automobile industry extend beyond the plants and into the communities in which the plants are
located. The regional impacts are severe in the older urban areas in
Michigan, Illinois, New York, Ohio, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania, where many of the closed facilities are located and, consequently, unemployment is high.
Employment adjustments in all U.S. automobile companies have
traditionally been characterized by short-term layoffs and subsequent
recalls. During their unemployment, automobile workers are eligible
to receive unemployment benefits (UI) from the government's unemployment insurance system and weekly supplementary benefits (SUB)
from an employer-financed unemployment fund. The current situtation of the automobile industry, however, suggests that many of the
workers on indefinite layoff may not return to their jobs. The programs of income maintenance are not oriented toward either permanent assistance or aiding the worker's adjustment to new employment.
In fact, by mid-1980, over ninety percent of the SUB funds of both
Ford and Chrysler had been depleted due to the prolonged unemployment of their workers.
The major government program of assistance to automobile
workers who lose their jobs has been the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program. Initially established in 1962 following the Kennedy
Round of multilateral tariff reductions, the program was expanded by
the Trade Act of 1974 to provide weekly benefits and re-employment
services, over and above UI and, in some cases, SUB benefits, to
workers whose job loss was certified to have been caused, in part, by
increased imports. Between April 1975 and September 1981, the Department of Labor certified 556 petitions for trade adjustment assistance covering over 700,000 workers. Over 3,000 of the 4,000 workers
in the Hamtramk Assembly plant cited above, for example, were certified to receive adjustment assistance benefits.
Beyond providing benefits to laid-off workers, the government
provided the Chrysler Corporation in 1980 with loan guarantees totalling $1.5 billion in order to prevent the collapse of the company and
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job losses for its 200,000 workers. As part of the aid package,
Chrysler was required to raise $2.1 billion in private funds and submit
an adjustment plan to the government demonstrating the company's
ability to operate past 1983 without further federal government assistance. Beyond this adjustment assistance to Chrysler, however, the
government has argued, in denying a 1980 petition for relief from imports, that imports are not a substantial cause of serious injury to the
industry and further assistance in the form of trade protection is not
warranted.
The U.S. Steel Industry
The major U.S. steel producers have been adversely affected
throughout the 1970's by a combination of rising production costs,
declines in the growth of the work market for steel, and declines in
the U.S. shares of both the world and domestic steel markets. During
this period imports rose by thirty-one percent while exports dropped
by sixty percent and employment in the industry declined by over
120,000 workers. Currently, the sources of growth in the industry are
the new, smaller mini-mills and specialty steel mills rather than the
larger integrated mills.
Employment levels in the steel industry have not only been in a
state of gradual long-term decline, but have also fluctuated in a highly
cyclical pattern since the peak employment level in 1969. As in the
automobile industry, employment declines in the steel industry were
greatest in the 1970 and 1973-75 recessions. Employment levels,
however, did not fully recover following 1975, and declined sharply
again in 1980.
Since 1975, there have been numerous plant shutdown in the
steel industry resulting in the permanent loss of over 60,000 jobs. In
1977 alone, over 10,000 employees were permanently displaced. Between 1977 and 1980, the industry closed nineteen plants. The Bethlehem Steel Company, which operates one of the most efficient plants
in the world at Burns Harbor, Indiana, has permanently shut down
operations, either totally or partially, in about thirty-five of its facilities affecting over 15,000 workers.
Bethlehem Steel and the other major producers operating large,
integrated mills are engaged in a massive program of capital investment to modernize existing plants. Over the next year, the steel industry is forecasted to become smaller but more productive with
fewer employees manning more modern capital equipment. Key ar-
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eas of investment include the replacement of open hearth furnaces
with basic oxygen and electric furnaces, and the construction of continuous casters, larger coke ovens, and finishing mills. Furthermore,
although no manpower programs exist for workers in the steel industry, the government has certified over 130,000 laid off steel workers as
eligible for employment adjustment benefits under the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program.
Japanese Shipbuilding Industry
The Japanese shipbuilding industry has enjoyed a large share of
the world market during the last two decades ranging from fifty to
sixty percent in peak times, to thirty to forty percent in recessed
times. The world demand for vessels increased steadily during the
1960's but declined drastically since the oil crisis in 1973. The volume
of demand dropped almost by half between 1974 and 1978. This drastic change in world demand had a direct impact on the Japanese shipbuilding industry. Furthermore, the competitive position of the
Japanese shipbuilding industry has been steadily eroded by competition from newly industrialized countries.
As a consequence, the Japanese shipbuilding industry was
obliged to make drastic structural adjustments both in terms of its
capital equipment and its labor force. Employment adjustment was
carried out on a substantial scale during the years following the oil
crisis. Employment was reduced from a peak of 200,000 workers in
1974 to 100,100 in 1979. Many shipbuilding companies had to undergo serious adjustments both in terms of capital equipment and
human resources.
The shipbuilding industry also has been under the strict control
of the government on the basis of shipbuilding laws designed for various classes of builders. During the recent adjustments period, the industry formed a recession cartel under the guidance of the
government and promoted a substantial reduction of productive capacity under the guidelines of the Structurally Depressed Industries
Law. Considerable adjustment in capital equipment was carried out
in the form of buying excess capacity by a credit organization which
was established by the ad hoc measure. Let us describe briefly some
of the notable examples of employment adjustments in the shipbuilding industry.
Substantial employment adjustments were carried out also for
large shipbuilders, such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industry (HI), IHI, Ka-

1987]

Labor Relations

617

wasaki Heavy Industry (HI), Hitachi Shipbuilding Company (SC),
Mitsui Shipbuilding Company (SC), and Sumito Heavy Machinery
Company. By 1972 or 1973 when the prospect of a recession was
recognized (the recession was due, in part, to the revaluation of the
yen), most of these large companies adopted adjustment policies
which included halting the recruitment of mid-career workers and reducing the number of new recruits.
By 1975 or 1976 when the "structural depression" of the shipbuilding industry was recognized, each company launched substantial
employment reduction plans. For example, in 1976, Hitachi SC announced a plan to reduce 3,300 employees from its payroll: 2,300
workers were trimmed through attrition with the remaining 1,000
transferred to a subsidiary or other related company. In 1975, Kawasaki HI decided to reduce 1,500 manual workers and 900 office workers within three years. Mitsubishi HI reduced its workforce by 8,500
employees within two years: 1,500 by compulsory retirement, 3,300
by natural attrition, and 3,700 by transfer to 104 related companies.
Mitsubishi Auto Company and Sato Machinery Company each accepted more than 100 transferred workers from Mitsubishi HI.
In 1978, even more substantial employment adjustments were enacted. For instance, Hitachi SC adopted selective temporary training
layoffs for some workers and transferred still others to different companies; e.g., 230 to Daihatsu Auto Company, 40 to Toyo Rubber
Company, 150 to Hitachi Manufacturing Company, etc. Mitsubishi
HI also executed temporary layoffs for training and transferred 850
employees to Mitsubishi Auto Sales Comapany and 200 to Toyo Auto
Company. IHI, also, applied temporary layoffs to workers in several
plants and sent workers to various related companies. Nippon Kokan
Company in 1978 reduced 1,000 employees within a year, Kawasaki
HI reduced its workforce by 3,500 employees by 1979, and Mitusi SC
reduced its workforce by 2,000 in a few years, all by a combination of
natural attrition, regular compulsory retirement and out-company
transfers.
Recognizing the adverse economic conditions faced by the company and attempting to take advantage of the favorable conditions
given to persons who voluntarily retire at an early age, many workers
began to opt for early retirement. In some companies, the number of
employees who retired early exceeded the planned number of employment reductions.
In contrast to these relatively well planned and carefully organ-
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ized processes of employment adjustment in very large companies,
some troubled companies, often in the class of small or medium-sized
companies, had difficulties throughout the process of employment adjustment. For example, Hakodate Dock Company, a company of this
class, twice presented to the two unions organizing its workers a "rationalization plan" in 1978 which contained the solicited retirement of
1,000 workers and a ten percent wage cut. Failing to secure an agreement from the two unions, the company was unable to carry out the
plan and had to run a large deficit. The company eventually had to
sell its new shipbuilding facilities to the credit organization and terminate the construction of large ships. However, the massive layoffs of
1,000 to 1,200 workers which the company still needed for its reconstruction failed to be carried out due to union resistance. Employment was eventually reduced by the beginning of 1979 through outcompany transfers, temporary layoffs of 200 employees and sizeable
reductions of overtime hours and various fringe benefits for all remaining workers.
Japanese Textile Industry
The decline in international competitiveness of the Japanese textile industry has become increasingly conspicuous since the late
1960's. This is seen in such symptoms as the decline in its world market share and a secular decline in Japan's exports relative to imports.
In addition to this long-term decline in international competitiveness,
the trade frictions with the U.S., the impacts of the drastic re-valuation of the yen and the oil crisis during the late 1960's and 1970's have
seriously shaken the Japanese textile industry and made substantial
employment and capacity adjustments unavoidable.
In 1971, Unitica Company, a large textile manufacturer, decided
to carry out massive employment adjustments over a two-year period
which included the reduction of 5,000 employees and the shutdown of
some plants. The company planned to reduce employees by taking
advantage of the relatively high natural attrition of female workers,
extensive transfers of workers to branches of the company, and voluntary early retirement. The adjustment process was delayed when the
local union, with the assistance of the national textile worker's union
-
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opposed the plan of soliciting early retirement. How-

ever, in subsequent years, the large-scale reduction of employees was
eventually achieved by extensively utilitizing transfers of workers to

1987]

Labor Relations

subsidiary companies, which were separated from the parent company, and other unrelated companies.
Mitsubishi Rayon, a large synthetic fiber manufacturer, announced in 1972 that it planned to reduce 2,000 employees within a
year and a half by techniques of stopping new recruitment, shutting
down plants and transferring workers. Extensive employment reductions have also been carried out by other major producers such as
Toray, Teijin and Asahi Kasei Company. Common employment adjustment methods among these firms included the restructuring of
business activities by closing or contracting textile plants and tranferring workers to other operations, and solicitations of early retirement
as a last resort.
Adverse impacts on medium-size firms in the spinning and synthetic fiber segments of the industry have been more severe than for
larger firms in the industry. Many of these mid-size firms had to close
their plants and were obliged to conduct dismissals and solicitations
of early retirement during the adjustment period of the 1970's.
As a result of such "rationalization," the major synthetic fiber
manufacturers reduced 33,000 employees or thirty-eight percent of total previous employment during the four years since 1975. Their market position was restored and profitability levels, though slim, were
achieved by 1979.
This completes a brief and selective review of employment adjustment experiences of individual firms in several major industries.
As one can clearly see from this brief review, the mode of employment adjustment measures is quite different between the large firms in
key industries. The former is characterized by smooth and carefully
coordinated processes incorporating a variety of adjustment measures;
the latter is more frictional, far-reaching, and at times fatal. The former is known to be a typical Japanese type of adjustment. However,
although it is certainly typical in the sense that such features are characteristic of large firms in major export-oriented industries, it should
also be noted that the adjustment experiences in the medium and
smaller-sized firms are commonly found throughout the Japanese
economy.

